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**Crime as a Cultural Problem. The Relevance of Perceptions of Corruption to Crime Prevention. A Comparative Cultural Study in the EU-Accession States Bulgaria and Romania, the EU-Candidate States Turkey and Croatia and the EU-States Germany, Greece and United Kingdom**

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**Perceptions of Corruption in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Croatia, Greece, Germany and the United Kingdom**

**A Content Analysis of Interviews from Target Group Civil Society**



## BULGARIA

### Target Group Civil Society

#### *Definitions*

NGOs have had a major role in promoting anti-corruption discourse in the country and therefore it is not surprising that they conceptualize the phenomenon of corruption in the most complicated and comprehensive manner. NGOs define corruption broadly as an abuse of power for personal gain. This is the definition largely used by international anti-corruption organisations such as Transparency International. This definition refers mainly to political corruption, and not to corruption in the private sector. Corruption is considered to be an normal practice and in this sense it is not as anything unusual, a one-off event, but is quite widespread not only in Bulgaria but also in the rest of the world. Corruption can be present in every area of social life but in some areas it might be more harmful than in other. These are cases where not only the system (institutions) but also citizens are affected. Corruption in education is very unpleasant but corruption in healthcare is a real life-threatening problem, and this should be the main criterion for classifying different forms of corruption.

Another very dangerous form of corruption is perceived to be the trading in influence. It is dangerous because it is very difficult to detect and prove. This is probably the most common type of corruption crime but it is very difficult to prove because it takes place within the relationships of persons, who do not have interest in disclosing the activity and giving evidence.

#### *Origin and Causes*

The representatives of the civil society target group believe that generally corruption is not a cultural phenomenon. Petty corruption could be culturally dependent on and connected with cultural heritage, with the culture of society at large, and with understandings about forms of gratuity gifts, etc., but this does not hold for the case of grand, political corruption.

The vision of the universal nature of corruption corresponds to the understanding that in general it is not connected with the legacy of socialism. Some influence is possible, but it is not decisive. Corruption also exists in developed capitalist countries and the core cause of the phenomenon is the lack of efficient control and enforcement both for grand political corruption and for petty corruption, which could be culturally-dependent to some extent.

Another possible cause of corruption is poverty. For example, this is the case in Africa. This coincides with the approach of Transparency International, which sees poverty and corruption are two interconnected phenomena, which feed on each other and generate each other.

The second set of causes of corruption as seen by representatives of this target group includes factors related to institutional performance, such as the lack of effective control and enforcement in some areas (public procurement mostly, but not exclusively), and the poor capacity of investigatory bodies to investigate corruption crimes efficiently.

The lack of information and the lack of a culture of identification of corruption by the people is seen as an additional reason for the spread of corruption. Very few citizens know that active



and passive bribery are both crimes and very often it is believed that only taking bribes constitutes a crime.

Last but not least, the lack of political will amongst Bulgarian political class is also an important factor.

### *Size and Scope*

Contrary to respondents from almost all other target groups included in this study, the NGO representatives believe that corruption can be measured. The measurement is based on a study of perceptions similar to the method applied by Transparency International for its CPI index. One of the components that are measured is the impact of corruption on the life of ordinary citizens. According to these studies, three years ago more than 80 per cent of the citizens declared that corruption exercises strong influence on their personal life. Now the situation has changed and slightly more than 50 per cent declare so.

Another dimension of corruption that NGOs attempt to measure is the size of the bribes paid in different public spheres. According to NGOs studies the highest bribes are paid in the judicial system.

### *Effects*

There are two major groups of negative social effects of corruption as seen by NGO representatives. The first one encompasses the negative effect on democratic institutions, as corruption undermines the public trust in them. The second one includes economic aspects such as the impoverishment of the population due to the non-regulated ways of distribution of public resources. Privatization procedures are a good example of this process.

### *Anti-corruption Measures*

One set of anti-corruption ideas concerns the possible improvement of existing anti-corruption measures in terms of better coordination and implementation. The reason for the poor effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies is not that much in the balance of powers, but rather in the lack of effective interaction and cooperation between the agencies engaged in counteracting corruption. The fight against corruption crimes requires the joint efforts of many institutions. This is the job not only of prosecutors, but also of the court, anti-corruption commissions, the government, etc. Another problem of a similar nature is the lack of transparency in the work of anti-corruption bodies themselves, which leads to more public distrust in the capacity of the system to counteract corruption.

The major conclusion is that in terms of legislation and institutions building a lot has been done already. The problem is that the institutions do not use the powers they have to full extent and this is where the efforts should focus. If however, a new institution is to be established, this could be only a special anti-corruption agency. In order to be efficient it should be within the prosecutor's office and should have large investigative powers. There is no need for other anti-corruption bodies, such as the Commission for the fight against corruption at the Council of Ministers, because all they can do is in to educate, produce brochures, and monitor the implementation of action plans. Efficient anti-corruption activities, however, require investigative powers in order to punish persons involved in



corruption and in this way play a prevention role in society at large.

As regards the question about the focus of a successful anti-corruption strategy, the respondents believe that it should be placed on both grand and petty corruption. This requires that both approaches the top-down and the bottom-up are applied in parallel. On the level of grand corruption, the focus should be on transparency and control of party financing, which is the main engine of corruption in politics. On the level of petty corruption, the first step is to narrow the popular perception about corruption. Corruption is cited as an explanation for too many different problems, which are not related to corruption. This lack of understanding of the essence of the phenomenon reflects on the citizens' perceptions and leads to exaggerated levels in the perception of the phenomenon.

The NGOs representatives consider the lack of good investigative journalism in Bulgaria to be serious shortcoming of the anti-corruption efforts in the country. According to them, the major role of media are to work on particular cases of corruption. The lack of investigative capacity amongst journalists is considered to be the main reason for the poor media coverage on the topic of corruption.

The role of NGOs in anti-corruption activities is perceived to be supportive and cooperative to the government's efforts for counteracting corruption. However, another equally important function of NGOs is to correct government activities.



## **ROMANIA**

In the Romanian report analysis was based in a comparison between perceptions of corruption regarding different fields of the problem without distinguishing in different target groups. For more information please see the Romanian report in “Scientific Report Romania 2007” in this web site.



## TURKEY

### *The Analysis of the Target Group Civil Society*

Corruption is the result of the modernity. Today's modern world is vulnerable in creating common ethics and therefore, encourages each person to live individually in their own ethical values. In situations where law does not function properly, individual immorality easily becomes legitimate. The "nouveaux riches" that popped up due to the opportunities provided by the new economic system have invaded the public space at the same pace. All these developments destroy ethical norms and justify self-positioning in the framework of personal interests. The so called system forces any decision maker to play by its rules

Modernity is not able to produce mutual behavioral patterns. Therefore, the instinct of corruption automatically becomes natural. Inspection of this would require a willful legislative and a powerful jurisdiction over the system. Unless this is realized, the only remaining item of inspection is the media, which itself is a tool of self-reproduction of the system. Theoretically NGOs would be needed severely if the legislative system was weak. Nevertheless, nothing is exempt from the present mental condition. Therefore being an NGO does not have a meaning itself. It is nothing more than a format.

In fact, the definition provided by the leading regulatory agencies (World Bank, IMF) or the NGOs operating under the ideological umbrella (TI) is far from questioning the logic of the system. Corruption, in this context, is defined in a limited manner, as the misuse of public office for private gain. Even though corruption pertains to explicit, transactional reciprocity, such a definition clearly exculpates the business world and social (kinship, religious, etc.) networks. However, especially in the Turkish case, these two should be held responsible for corruption's being so widespread. Especially, the latter, in the name of having their share of public resources, support *the corruption economy* with their votes. Especially, the latest election results are open to evaluation within this context. The high rate of votes the AKP received in the 2007 General Elections due to the distribution of public resources very well demonstrates the fact that the society in general is not only inured to corruption but also willing to be a part of it for their own interests.

Lack of severe punishment and the unequal distribution of income are two of the most important factors that trigger the internalization of this implicit consensus. When this basic motivation that lies beneath the support given to certain political factions, i.e. the format of making politics in Turkey is taken into consideration, a one-dimensional definition of corruption limiting itself with the public sector mal-practices seems too inadequate. Corruption therefore should be redefined in such an expanded way that it comprises social and ethical values. Otherwise, the measures taken for its prevention would not be functional. In this context, to question the boundaries of ethical values and codes in Turkey may be of great help in understanding what is or what is not perceived as corruption and why.

In fact, since the Ottoman Empire, ethical codes have been too much restricted in the private sphere in Turkish society. Stealing from the State has always been acceptable while stealing from a neighbor has not; because the State has never been and still is not considered as a common institution. In other words, the understanding that the State provides public services is nonexistent. In the Ottoman Empire, until before the political reforms in 1839 all the bureaucrats except soldiers received money from those they served and the line between that payment and bribery was so vague. There was the State one gets its work done in return for



money although it should have been its right. That habit continues despite the reformation, because the state did not want to adapt itself to it. Although the structure is transformed, the mental condition of those who form the state did not. The same old understanding and behavior pattern persist there.

In Turkey, State is still perceived as *something* that is not clearly defined and known. *Whoever holds it, will have some piece of it.* It is mainly perceived as a field of privilege out of society. It is this very perception that leads to corruption. This is why people are continuously competing to get a job in government offices despite relatively low salaries. In this fashion, they can belong to a privileged network.

Since the legitimacy of State is systematically questioned and its structure has been clearly known, it would not be surprising to witness ordinary people abusing its resources whenever they have the opportunity to do so. So, the fact that society is inured to corruption is not a new phenomenon in Turkey. It has been continuing for centuries and the vice versa would be odd. Accepting corruption has always been the rule of survival. The majority of people secluded from the State directed itself to narrower fields of life and learnt to be *happy*. Others, however, learnt to hide themselves and their corrupt acts. The society has vast experience. It exists for centuries. In the Ottoman period, the land used to belong to the state. Now it is a Republic and the Republic also does not want to hand it over. Because, the state attaches more importance to land than it does to people. Ultimately, this is not something harmful. We can evacuate Cyprus but do not hand it over. If people become secondary issues and the hegemony of the State on land is of primary importance, corruption is expected to increase. However, right at this point, there is an ironical contradiction, because, mainly at the local level, the State has absolutely no power or no willingness to end shanty settlements. Right here, the mafia steps in. People in need of housing need some kind of regulation. This, naturally, destroys the legitimacy of the State in the eyes of the people severely.

This fact has a different reflection on ordinary citizens. The forest lands for example, people do not feel that they belong to them, as citizens. An average citizen reads in a newspaper that the forests in some holiday resort are burning and he turns the page negligently. He can see the corruption behind it, he even expresses it loudly but he does not feel really uncomfortable.

Moreover, due to the rapid development and high migration of people from Anatolia to the West, the social structure of Turkey is constantly changing. Throughout this process, a new type of bourgeois has emerged in vast demand for resources which previously were used by only a small elite group. In this situation there existed two options which were either fighting on resources or expansion of the pool. And, Turkey preferred the latter one.

But still, until some 20 -30 years ago, it was possible to do business even in Istanbul with people whom you do not know without a debenture. There was a social network in the business world. Within the social network there was an enormous reciprocal trust relationship among business networks. The ethical standards were high. However, beyond the net there was a huge amount of tax evasion. The agent of the uncertain field outside this net was the frightening government financial inspector who could suddenly enter their workplaces.

Economic liberalization process however destroyed the above mentioned implicit contract. Mainly the economic paradigm shift after 1983 facilitated corruption and the idea and the desire to be rich became the major issue regardless of the source of the money. Sudden and



incredible increase in the life standards of some with no questions asked whatsoever, made the rest envious and daring. Accordingly, by 1990s the situation had changed dramatically and the old ethical codes within the social networks had already been eroded.

The fact that the efficiency and the influence of the political class is based on the number of people it could reach by handing out first and foremost economic favors caused over employment and bulky bureaucracy. Eventually, the structure of the state became ponderous.

Corruption is at its peak in all target groups except for the NGOs. However, politicians, as the main actors to fight against corruption, are not expected to change their position with regards to favoritism unless the meaning of politics alters and the sphere of politics expands. In this sense, the argument that the economic crisis in early 2000s ended the possibility of distribution of public resources and forced the politicians to take certain precautions seems to be doubtful. Because, the center means having the potential to create resources as long as the result is accepted. Moreover, due to the global economic system local governments are able to obtain funds from abroad.

The abolishing parliamentary immunity is right and this is a real issue in Turkey. NGOs has very limited influence on this issue. The political willingness is a must at this point. On the other hand, it would be naïve to expect an initiative on this issue from such a dirty political structure where the first five rows to MP candidates are sold in exchange for money.

### *Conclusion (On Prevention)*

The means for struggle of corruption in the modern world is a true differentiation of legislation, execution, jurisdiction and media. Media must form a healthy connection with society, create awareness and become the instrument of inspection. NGOs are relatively new bodies and they do not hold much power. Yet, they can create sensitivity in certain groups. However, the fact that social opposition is conducted by NGOs instead of political parties is as a sign of deviation from liberal democracy. As for Turkey, legislation, execution and jurisdiction are intermingled. However, more important than that are the restrictions imposed on the political sphere by the state ideology and its protectors.

Even politicians do not know how some decisions are made in Turkey; they learn some of the decisions later on. There is a world that politicians are not involved in the decision-making process. Only the field of economy is left to the politicians. At this point, the question “Who wants to be a politician?” could be raised. The answer is; “the ones who are in the interest networks.” People are very well aware of these restrictions of politics in Turkey. The fight against corruption will accelerate if and only if the political sphere expands, i.e. the politics can be made in accordance with its common definition rather than getting stuck in the practices related to distribution of public resources. Therefore, the elimination of certain cadres that encloses the political sphere, the establishment of democratic standards would naturally bring a change to the profile of politicians and the political agenda. In today’s political structure, the notions like transparency, accountability, political ethic, etc. are of secondary importance. This is the only way to let honest people who do not have a hidden agenda enter into political domain. If honest and decent people could be in charge in Turkey, and if these people could set good examples for the public, people would definitely take them




as role models. Because, Turkish people are inclined to take examples of their leaders and follow their conducts.

A proper distribution of income will have certain positive result in the struggle with corruption.

Above all, EU process (adaptation to the EU legal acquis), will have a positive impact on Turkey's struggle against corruption, though, not eliminate it entirely. The ongoing process will support transparency and especially beneficial for the amendment of the public procurement law Turkey could import proper behavior patterns from EU. This is even more important than the legal regulations related to corruption prevention.

# CROATIA TARGET GROUP NGO



# GERMANY

## Target Group Civil Society

### *Outline*

The analysis of the interviews with officials of TI focuses on two dimensions of the organisation. At first attention is paid to the embeddedness of the anti-corruption organisation in the civil society movement of the last two decades. The contribution of TI rests not only upon its success in setting corruption on the agenda of governmental policies, but also in creating an economic space, in which various institutional actors are involved. In this way TI has triggered a development that spans far beyond the commitments of civil society action. The second dimension analysed refers to the way TI implemented its ‘bottom-up’ approach, that is, to help the people directly become involved in fighting corruption, by creating the *Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres* (ALACs) as a missing link between institutional, legislative action and everyday perceptions of corruption. Particular emphasis is put on the role the ALACs have so far played in anchoring the issue of fighting corruption in society, but also on organisational aspects of their relation to TI, and questions of further developing co-operation as well.

### *Analysis*

#### *I. On Civil Society and Transparency International*

Like all social circumstances corruption cannot be dissociated from or rather coincides with what in the society is taken to be as such, that is, it is essentially constituted as a social fact by being perceived as something to account with or react upon. Thus it comes as no surprise that *creating* (innovating, “inventing”) that social-perceptual field in which corruption must necessarily be regarded as something that must be dealt with was the innovative move of the grounding circle of Transparency International as it succeeded in making corruption an issue of public concern [P1: 209-213].

However, ‘inventing’ corruption does not imply free-floating construction. Not matter how innovative the idea may be under certain circumstances, ‘corruption’ will not be raised as an issue needing urgently be tackled in terms of broad social awareness unless it is perceived as somehow dysfunctional or particularly disrupting in times of socio-political transformation [P1: 681-688]. This in turn is most likely to be the case, when the stability of the social whole is disturbed – or on the contrary, where society is perceived as stable, – as for example in Sweden – corruption, though existing, will not be thought of as ‘that bad’, since everything else is in place and works. The former socialist countries could be considered as stable and thus in a paradoxical way somehow impervious to the criticism of corruption (as necessarily being something evil) because in the stifling rigidity of bureaucratic all-round control – the whole itself being highly corrupt [P1: 441-445] – corrupt ‘deviation’ was the only way for the citizens to get through, survive, or even to turn the tables around on the system [P1: 546-552]. Instability is of course an insignium par excellence of transition societies, in which the course of modernisation is bound to be accompanied by a mismatch between society and power [P1: 660-667]. Accordingly, the perception of corruption taking place *and* being dysfunctional will not arise by itself, but only in the context of a broader public awareness of structural frictions, deeply affecting socio-political problems [P1: 698-700] and the necessity of radical reforms



[P1: 429-432]. The sifting power constellations characteristic of societies engulfed in the socio-economic upheavals of the transition period however need not be the only cause of the increased and broader awareness of corruption. Accompanying the ongoing globalisation process and the concomitant restructuring of the international institutional regulatory framework there is obviously a *control deficit* to the extent that the institutions steering and monitoring global interdependencies are still on the making thus leaving gaps to be filled by a kind of emerging global sovereignty. Due to this control and sovereignty deficit the present global transition period has except for widening the field of transnational action also facilitated corruption [P1: 361-364].

Coming now to the trajectory of Transparency International, it goes without saying that setting up the idea of corruption as being a state of affairs needed be coped with by society at large was only the initial stage of bringing and establishing the issue in the realm of public affairs. Societal significance could be attained only to the extent that the corruption discourse could be made that issue upon and in terms of which a determinate social stance could be articulated. Hence the need not only

- a) to provide for the prerequisites of the anti-corruption stance being anchored in an articulate social group action (“movement”),
- but also subsequently of
- b) making the movement be heard, that is, through the exercise of social influence bring about wider public awareness and institutional change, and
- c) Controlling institutional implementation through a monitoring process that tests whether changes are substantial and standards are met [P1: 213-219].

Socially situated stances like this one bearing upon and carried by an articulate group action are of course part and parcel of civil society: private group action for public good. Raising sensibility for and helping establish mechanisms against corruption or any other issue perceived as a socially relevant field of action originates in that sphere that in contrast to the institutional complex of public-state governance is called private. However, as regards both the mobilisation radius and the institutional change this private initiative can effect it can also be seen as component of the process of advancing the public good or extending democratic participation. Contrary to the wide-spread notion of investing them with powers that they cannot dispose of, it can by no means be supported – as some activists usually do falling into a sort of civil society fundamentalism [P1: 120] – that the organisations of civil society are somehow empowered by an unified entity-body called “civil society” to come to negotiations with the central state power [P1: 163-169]. In this sense it is important to distinguish two layers of enacting democratic procedures: representative and participative democracy [P1: 170-177]. Whereas the former mediates the articulation of private interests by means of party politics, the latter lends itself organisation forms of direct interest articulation.

This in turn should not be taken that unmediated, because the “sparkling” idea? (innovation [P1: 205]) originates in a private initiative, although the way it is widely taken up, that is, how it comes about being perceived as a sound/legitimate reason of a broader social engagement and worth fighting for, is not that straightforward. In a certain sense it resembles the way an innovative product idea strikes roots in a market place [P1: 176-177] or an intellectual market place [P1: 129-130]. Under this light civil society organisations like Transparency International should not at all be thought of as organs of representation: As the market-place metaphor suggests the legitimacy does not consist of articulating ‘pre-existing’ interests, but *succeeding* in establishing the issue they stand for as a social state of affairs deserving public attention, organised action and institutional policy making. Since they do not represent any



clear-cut segment of the societal whole, let alone being elected from anybody, the only way of supplying the warrant of the claim to pursue a valid issue is public resonance, effective dissemination, inducing institutional action. Thus legitimacy boils down to success and this in turn is like in business [P1: 140-145; 181].

This of course goes against the grain of what civil society organisations usually believe their engagement is up to. Nevertheless, considered the other way round – that is, taking as starting point not the supposedly good-minded notion that the ‘good cause’ will prevail solely on account of its civil society origins, but merely the fact of civil society organisations having the freedom to raise up issues that may prove to be of wide societal significance –, it helps bring in a more pragmatic attitude. As a rule in the life of competitive markets goes, civil society organisations should always bear in mind: cherish or perish [P1: 180]. It is the market of public perceptions, opinions and attitudes that in the last instance decides on the validity of any innovative idea.

Things being that way Transparency International and other NGOs are confronted not so much with a legitimation – this having been decided upon and secured by public acceptance –, but rather an accountability deficit [P1: 376]: Being neither elected nor private companies it seems at first sight that NGOs are accountable to nobody else but themselves. This in turn casts their work and especially that of Transparency International in a peculiar light: Since legitimacy based solely on success does obviously not suffice to satisfy the requirement of accountability organised civil society engagement must be grounded on *transparency* as legitimation source [P1: 374-382]. Because it does not represent any prior existing interests, action in terms of civil society organisation is a self-sustaining process that needs draw legitimation from its own resources thus becoming self-reflective: Standing for transparency means in the first place transparent self-organisation, financing and work.

This self-reflection [P1: 489-490] as indispensable component of, or even legitimation ground for independent civil society engagement is all the more important in the face of certain side-effects establishing the anti-corruption agenda (among other issues) as major social concern has brought about.

- For one thing there is the phenomenon of the *anti-corruption industry* [P1: 492-493; 504-508]. Having successfully pushed through the issue of corruption and transparency as social values pertaining to the very substance of how attending to the public good should be practised Transparency International finds itself confronted with a number of organisations that to be sure share the same aim, albeit in the form of profit business, consulting companies, projects sponsored by international organisations (for example World Bank) etc. – in short an almost hundred and fifty million US Dollar annual anti-corruption market [P1: 504-505]. Paradoxically, the success of Transparency International, based as it were on a business-like notion, has caused the rise of a sort of market economy where transparency seems to function like business as usual and which of course TI cannot want to get into, lest it disavows its character as civil society organisation.
- In addition, another rather negative side-effect of the success of the anti-corruption agenda consists of its being instrumentalised by all sorts of political populism: *riding the anti-corruption ticket* has become a steady factor in politics for example in Eastern Central Europe [P1: 524-530].
- Establishing the social relevance of issues raised by civil society organisations meant from the start inducing institutional change. Now, putting transparency and anti-corruption (and



other civil society issues as well) on the agenda of good governance and rule-conforming economic behaviour has indeed caused institutional action, albeit in the form of a *counter-revolution* from above [P1: 226-236]: As a response to the revolutionary impetus of the rise and spread of ‘grass-roots’ organisation forms in the transition societies of East Europe in the eighties and nineties the state in Europe and the USA has introduced a new framework of rules and regulations in which civil society organisations can operate. This of course restrains in a way their freedom of action, since their major competitive advantages consists in the ability to act swiftly and not to be bound by rules [P1: 152-154].

- With the break-down of the bipolar block confrontation of the post-war international order and the rapid increase of interdependencies (‘globalisation’) civil society and NG Organisations have gained new freedoms and expanded the radius of transnational agitation work and action. However, on the same grounds of international, intercontinental operation there have also developed new possibilities for organised crime, illicit trade and international terrorism. Paradoxically (and ironically), as regards some criteria of independent civil society engagement, e. g. ‘grass-root’ activism, non-governmental action, innovative ideas to promote, such networks such as the terrorist Al-Qaida do not seem to differ all that much from the mainstream of NGO action [P1: 241-244].

## *II. TI and ALACs (Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres)*

The initial impulse for setting up the ALACs was based on the awareness that, since corruption has become an issue needed to be accounted for in governmental policies, there was a *link missing* to connect preventive policies and implementation [P2: 308-315]. In addition, as initially TI and other organisations working against corruption were rather expert fields, civil society came to be seen as an indispensable factor in order to make intervention sustainable, because it did not only help anchoring corruption prevention policies. Furthermore, the ALACs as form of organised societal intervention and, simultaneously, a result of the ‘bottom-up’ approach of TI, have indeed proved to be a source of information and knowledge about what every preventive policy must be aware of and able to deal with: *how corruption woks in practice* [P2: 353-357; 341-345]. Not the least of the merits that commitment in the work of an ALAC involves is the work with individuals which in turn fosters the understanding of how canny for example officials frequently behave when devising schemes and plans in order to bypass existing legislation and get bribes [P2: 297-300]. This is obviously even more true with people being confronted with and tormented by corruption on a daily basis [P2: 72-75].

Of course, people turn to the Centres for help (e.g. using the hotlines, seeking advisory and legal assistance, etc.) but this is only the one side of reacting to the fact that corruption is being rooted in everyday life. Even more important though regarding the need to deepen the understanding of corruption by using concrete action, is the effort to evaluate incoming information by transforming it into action motivating knowledge, that is, know-how as a prerequisite of and reason for structural change [P2: 394-401]. However, the ALACs are not only a focus point in the sense of providing an institution in order to perceive how corrupt conduct is experienced in everyday life. Through the composition of their organisation they also *reflect* certain cultural characteristics of the countries in which they operate [P2: 639-640] – for example, the Rumanian ALAC with its rules-based, systematic work seems to reflect some bureaucratic mentalities in the country.



The reflection of social-cultural realities applies to the national chapters of TI in general, as well as the wide range of motivations, backing up the commitment to work on the fight against corruption that attest to the manifold nature of the phenomenon. Whereas for some people anti-corruption is an essential part of social activism, others consider it to be a necessary step to clear up the economic field of disturbing influences thus creating new opportunities for economic action. If one additionally takes into account all the academics, ex-politicians, professional managers, etc. involved in the work of the national chapters of TI, then it is easy to observe the variety of social backgrounds and reasons motivating anti-corruption commitment [P2: 883-890].

This diversity may as well be linked to the fact that the relation between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, that is, TI being located in Berlin and the national chapters or for the ALACs is in contrast to such NGOs as Green Peace not one of centralised leadership [P2: 744-745], because the latter enjoy great autonomy which they are unsurprisingly at pains to safeguard [P2: 219-221]. This of course sparks off a number of issues concerning the degree of effective co-operation:

- First of all there is the need to *standardise* the way incoming information has to be processed in order to yield a uniform basis of data collection (e.g. ‘generic database’) with all issues passing through a central instance [P2: 253-255]. Although in some cases there do exist contractual relations between the ‘Centre’ and the national ALACs, thus forcing them to comply with certain technical requirements, in others there are no such contractual bonds. In those cases the only thing the ‘Centre’ can do is to try to persuade the ALACs in question to adopt the database system thus functioning as a service provider [P2: 723-731]. Additionally, TI still does not have the financial resources to run such a database system that requires a number of full-time employees to do that.
- The fact that *decentralisation and centralised monitoring* inevitably leads to frictions concerning effective co-operation. Since a central management on a daily basis is neither possible nor desired, TI confines itself to the task of making sure that the ALACs, which of course must already use the appropriate staff, have the infrastructure needed (e.g. hotlines, advertisement, financial reporting, and pragmatic reporting) [P2: 632-634]. For this reason, professionalisation need not contradict the missionary spirit of social activism, as especially around financial management there can be only one rule to keep in mind: keep the quality standards (transparency!) high [P2: 848-855; 830-834]. That is the reason why TI can combine the idealism of fighting for the right principle with a technocratic attitude towards the organisation of this fight [P2: 1184-1191].
- Along with the issue, that over the years, every organisation develops bureaucratic traits, arises the question to what extent TI plays an essential role, meaning enforcing a uniform policy to be followed by all ALACs/national chapters. Based on experience and far from imposing stream-lined rules and objectives, it was the national chapters themselves that called for the ‘Centre’ to apply monitoring procedures in order to *keep quality standards* [P2: 733-741]. Furthermore, in some cases the initiative to set agendas came from ‘below’, as some chapters took over the leadership on certain issues, for example, environmental corruption [P2: 750-757]. Additionally, another quite important reason for TI to assume a different, more active and civil society based character over the years has been, except participating in the meeting of the world social forum, the way the ALACs have propagated the cause of transparency.



Addressing the question of how effective the work of the ALACs has been so far, there are, apart from the actual advisory and legal help provided, possibly two controversial views. First of all, effectiveness can be assessed in relation to whether the work of the centres contributes to *structural changes* in terms of initiating reforms in penal legislation. This means that the amount of incoming information delivered by citizens that contact the centres, when statistically processed by TI, can be transformed into target knowledge about the respective penal laws that need to be changed. Thus individual cases, when appropriately bundled so that they are subsumable in the form of definite law paragraphs, can bring about penal reforms as, for example, it was the case in Rumania and Bosnia [P2: 408-417]. Of course no one can expect every individual case to be resolved. One reason for this is that the innovative work of the centres cannot automatically lead to institutional change – least of all this can be implemented in most of the countries where ALACs operate, namely countries in which the state has never been challenged by citizens in such a way [P2: 483-487].

In view of this, any percentage of cases however small it may be at first, that is registered by the police or judicial authorities can be considered a success. Additionally, the transformation of individual cases into *statistically quantitative phenomena* helps to make them observable in the first place, or even better, social facts of some relevance that can trigger institutional action. This is all the more important considering that more often than not governments react or act upon corrupt conduct only once they begin to perceive it as phenomenon having *systematic causes* [P2: 492-494]. If this does not happen, the government may take care of the complaints of the ALAC or the individual himself, ‘putting things right’, but this remains an individual case without any other consequences [P2: 504-506]. *Secondly*, but compared with the aforementioned of less importance, another way to assess the effectiveness is to look at how many people have been convicted based on the information delivered by the ALACs. This is of course extremely difficult to prove, as it is generally to trace back, or even better, to see prosecution being affected by any individual case of corrupt conduct ‘dropped in’ the pool of information of the ALAC in question [P2: 472-475].

### *III. TI, ALACs, fighting corruption*

From early on it has been the dominant belief of those who set the stage for the anti-corruption agenda that trying to confront the phenomenon head-on would not give any results, at least not in the long run. It should rather be seen as part of a reform process, which dimensions should be both institutional transformation and a change of socio-cultural mentalities. Now, over the last ten years at least, a considerable institutional shift towards addressing corruption as a structural problem has undoubtedly taken place. If one adds the phenomenon of an expanding anti-corruption industry, then it is clear that fighting corruption on this level does not show the deficits deplored a few years ago.

An issue of great urgency, however, remains the approach to the second dimension of fighting corruption as part of an on-going reform, that is, the effort to implement it in socio-cultural attitudes, which boils down to committing people to it: In other words, to ensure that things *are grounded in people’s perceptions* [P2: 1019-1026]. The setup of the ALACs TI has been an important step towards raising the chances of such a commitment, while at the same time facilitating the wider and more active commitment of the population. Therefore, strengthening them must be seen as an indispensable move towards the rise of sensibilities and the participation of citizens. This in turn implies the following:



- First of all, since the TI struggles for its own economic sustainability, further funding should be ensured;
- As the missing link between institutional reforms and changes of everyday attitudes, the system of ALACs should be consolidated and expanded in other countries;
- As far as the cooperation between TI and ALACs is concerned and in view of decentralisation, the demand for the systematisation of the evaluation of incoming information should be met;
- Furthermore, the centralised database for the collection of statistics should be used more frequently;
- This is all the more important in the face of the fact that centralised data processing leads to targeted knowledge and this in turn leads to concrete intervention steps regarding changes in the penal law.



## GREECE

### TG V CIVIL SOCIETY-NGOs

#### General Comments

Notwithstanding NGOs are relatively new structures in Greek society, existing since '90s, their number is very high. They work mainly in three areas: environment/ecology, local issues, social issues, with various success. Our interviewees represent three NGOs (TI-Hellas, Citizens' Movement and Network 21). TI-Hellas, as known, is working on anti – corruption issues, Citizens' Movement on general social issues and Network 21 is working on national issues such as external affairs, migration policy, Greek language, Greek Diaspora, demography etc. We carried out four interviews (TI-Hellas in two sessions).

#### Evaluation Units

P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL  
P10 TG NGOs\_KINHSEI POLITON  
P12 TG NGOs\_TI\_Hellas  
P13 TG NGOs\_free\_ex\_TI

#### Interviews' Analysis

Concerning the meaning of corruption, the interviewees take into consideration its moral, socio-political, and economical aspects. First of all, they accept the moral elements of anti-corruption debate<sup>1</sup>, according to which they link corruption to *dishonesty*, *shameless behaviour*<sup>2</sup>, *rotten system*<sup>3</sup>, *immoral behaviour* (even with sexual harassment<sup>4</sup>), and view it as *social illness*, *disease etc.*<sup>5</sup> and an issue of personal moral standards<sup>6</sup>. However, they are sceptical whether a policy can be effective though crusades<sup>7</sup> and overdrawings. Corruption is also accounted for negative *socio-political and economical phenomenon*<sup>8</sup> associated with the State<sup>9</sup> and economical structures<sup>10</sup>. Under this view, corruption is considered a process whereby a person uses his/her power and authority not for the benefit of the organization he/she participates – either public or private – but for his/her own good fit<sup>11</sup>. Corruption may

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<sup>1</sup> P10 TG\_NGOs\_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 64.

<sup>2</sup> P10 TG\_NGOs\_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 56.

<sup>3</sup> P10 TG\_NGOs\_KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 149.

<sup>4</sup> P9 TG\_NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 1.

<sup>5</sup> P12 TG\_NGOs\_TI\_Hellas: CODE 1.

<sup>6</sup> P10 TG\_NGOs\_KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 138, 139.

<sup>7</sup> P13 TG\_NGOs\_free\_ex\_TI: CODE 1.

<sup>8</sup> P12 TG\_NGOs\_TI\_Hellas: CODE 90.

<sup>9</sup> P13 TG\_NGOs\_free\_ex\_TI: CODE 3.

<sup>10</sup> P13 TG\_NGOs\_free\_ex\_TI: CODE 81.

<sup>11</sup> P13 TG\_NGOs\_free\_ex\_TI: CODE 95.



involve financial – tangible<sup>12</sup>, as well as intangible assets facilitating<sup>13</sup> or expanding an exchange network<sup>14</sup>. Corruption is described as a negative social reality<sup>15</sup>, and is used in exchange with *bribery-gift*<sup>16</sup>, *‘dealing under the table’*<sup>17</sup>, *‘citizen’s and employees’ mistreatment*<sup>18</sup>, *‘buying out’ – redemption* (e.g. of a public service)<sup>19</sup>, *use of means*<sup>20</sup>, *collusion of interests*<sup>21</sup>, *favouritism*<sup>22</sup>, *economic or political scandals*<sup>23</sup>, *money laundering*<sup>24</sup>, *tax evasion*, *insurance leaks*, *economic crime*<sup>25</sup> etc. Nonetheless, they admit that some forms of corruption do not violate laws but is the use of informal methods to bypass bureaucracy and speed up the accomplishment – fulfilment of a right (e.g. a licence<sup>26</sup>, cf. TG JUSTICE).

Occasionally, the interviewees admit not knowing the exact meaning of the term<sup>27</sup>, and agree that its overuse may not be helpful to describe and confront the problem<sup>28</sup>. According to them, corruption evolves mainly in the interface between public and private sector<sup>29</sup>. In our discussion, they focus on everyday corruption and attribute it to the shortcomings of public administration:

- a) Heavy bureaucracy<sup>30</sup>, big size and low efficiency.<sup>31</sup>
- b) Insufficient internal control mechanisms of public administration.<sup>32</sup>
- c) Manipulation of public sector by the political system.<sup>33</sup>
- d) Loose law enforcement.<sup>34</sup>
- e) Slow justice: ‘when justice is delayed, in fact justice is denied’<sup>35</sup>. The big delay in courts’ adjudication, result several times in statute barring.

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<sup>12</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 94.

<sup>13</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 96.

<sup>14</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 56.

<sup>15</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 75.

<sup>16</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 17.

<sup>17</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 26.

<sup>18</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 54; P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 142.

<sup>19</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 7.

<sup>20</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 89.

<sup>21</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 76.

<sup>22</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 8.

<sup>23</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 247.

<sup>24</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 188.

<sup>25</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 3.

<sup>26</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 12.

<sup>27</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 1.

<sup>28</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 3, 4.

<sup>29</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 35.

<sup>30</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 19, 24, 43, 129, 27, 29.

<sup>31</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 43-55.

<sup>32</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 241, 228, 16; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 146, 148.

<sup>33</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 121; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 21; P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 132, 133, 134.

<sup>34</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 28; P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 21; P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 230-232, 131.

<sup>35</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 32.



The public services most affected by corrupt methods are urban planning<sup>36</sup>, land registry services<sup>37</sup>, national defence (military supplies, especially arms<sup>38</sup>), public works and few others granting various licenses (personal or entrepreneurial)<sup>39</sup>.

Another area referred is policing and internal security, related to our second case study of the first phase. Criminal networks buy out protection and the public services of police. Illegal naturalizations and illegal immigration are examples of this form of corruption, as traffickers and party politics are the profiteers at the expense of social cohesion, national labour force and public order<sup>40</sup>. Inadequate police protection and police inertia<sup>41</sup> are associated with this form of corruption. According to this interview, the previous form is the most serious, since it discredits the state and questions public security<sup>42</sup>. Offering immunity to criminals, public administration can no longer provide security which is the basic precondition for society's proper functioning and therefore is no reason to pay taxes for it<sup>43</sup>.

Concerning grand corruption, our interviewees focus on politics. They consider that the Greek electoral system, with the big districts and the subsequent expensive pre-election campaigns<sup>44</sup>, makes politicians captured by private donors and interests<sup>45</sup>; the same applies with the parties<sup>46</sup>. Meritocracy is faded out and opacity is favoured in party financing<sup>47</sup>. Although the legislation for party financing is newly revised increasing the money submitted, and publication of political parties balance-sheets and candidates' sources is requested, most political parties and candidates, continue to be supported not only by the state budget, as the law foresees, but also by other not determined sources over the rates that the law sets<sup>48</sup>. MAYO case was an example of political parties' reliance on such financing at the grey zone of law<sup>49</sup>.

In relation to corruption in the private sector and economy, there are two approaches. According to the first, the interviewees use the argumentation of economy's target group: rules and ethics of competition and market forces, corporate governance, fame and enterprise are put in danger, use of corrupt practices by small family--owned enterprises etc.<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 13.

<sup>37</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 34.

<sup>38</sup> P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODE 36.

<sup>39</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 118; P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODES 39, 80.

<sup>40</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 21, 245, 246.

<sup>41</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 36-38.

<sup>42</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 24, 25, 54, 55, 92.

<sup>43</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 65.

<sup>44</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 5.

<sup>45</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 209.

<sup>46</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 6.

<sup>47</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 218, 213, 215.

<sup>48</sup> P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODES 85, 86.

<sup>49</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 68.

<sup>50</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 82, 86, 256; P12 TG NGOS TI Hellas: CODES 245, 236, 238, 234, 242, 240, 243, 244, 247, 251-255, 124, 126-131; P10 TG NGOS KINHSI POLITON: CODES 40, 42; P9 TG NGOS\_D21\_CHL: CODE 170.



According to the second approach, corrupt practices are often used in private sector, especially when the economic activities are not based on free competition and innovation<sup>51</sup>. Such examples are attaining state supplies and public works<sup>52</sup>, stockbrokers' illegal business<sup>53</sup>, unlawful completion<sup>54</sup>, fraud – especially securities fraud<sup>55</sup> – and other economic crimes and commercial violations. One interviewee criticises the Federation of Greek Industries for concealing business' participation in illegal practices by attributing responsibility to the public sector<sup>56</sup>. Several Greek enterprises are nourished by the State<sup>57</sup>, which they blame for corruption, and are over protected<sup>58</sup>, thus facilitating oligopolistic practices, for example, collusion by firms. Therefore free competition and transparency, as in the case of EU financing which was also followed by increasing corruption<sup>59</sup>, are impeded at the expense of the citizens<sup>60</sup>.

All in all, corruption is regarded leading to a vicious cycle – a dead end, where the state merges with private sector (enterprises and mass media) interests since none of them operates without the other<sup>61</sup>.

The interviewees criticise corruption from a moral as well as a social-economical point of view. It is considered responsible for under-development, inequality<sup>62</sup> and uncompetitiveness discouraging foreign investments<sup>63</sup>, while the big size of dysfunctional public sector diminishes society's productivity and wealth<sup>64</sup>. The target group rejects any positive effect that such practices eventually have<sup>65</sup> on counteracting social inequalities (i.e. unemployment)<sup>66</sup>. Apart from economical reasoning, the interviewees also reject corruption on political level since it destroys the constitutional organization of the state and the core meaning of democracy<sup>67</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 175.

<sup>52</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 203.

<sup>53</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 84, 96.

<sup>54</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 92, 197.

<sup>55</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 182.

<sup>56</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 178, 208.

<sup>57</sup> P13 TG NGOS free\_ex\_TI: CODES 11, 113.

<sup>58</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 106, 108.

<sup>59</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 135, 136.

<sup>60</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 110, 114, 115.

<sup>61</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 181; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODES 91, 35, 23; P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 168.

<sup>62</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 58, 60.

<sup>63</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 109, 119.

<sup>64</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 269, 267.

<sup>65</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 257.

<sup>66</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 260, 266, 268.

<sup>67</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 78.



The interviewees neither overestimate, nor underestimate the CPIs<sup>68</sup>; they consider that such indexes show only the trend of the phenomenon<sup>69</sup>; moreover that only by comparing Greece with other countries would be a motivation for Greece to be improved<sup>70</sup>.

It is interesting that NGOs regard also that citizens overdraw about the problem, thus creating a negative image of their country<sup>71</sup>. There are honest and dishonest people as in every country; there are 'two Greeces'<sup>72</sup>. However according to them, in developed countries corruption emerges only in elites (grand corruption)<sup>73</sup> (e.g. USA – Enron; Germany – Flick; GB – 'cash for honours inquiry'). Bribery is used by corporations for the promotion of investments in underdeveloped and developing countries<sup>74</sup>. In Greece petty corruption is expanded<sup>75</sup>. This form is visible and has negative consequences for citizens' morals and education<sup>76</sup>.

Another difference is law enforcement and punishment. In Greece 'big scandals' are either rarely cleared or the offenders are rarely punished, mainly if they are politicians<sup>77</sup>. They note politicians' impotence to be a model of behaviour for the citizens, especially when they do not acquit and do not be punished (top-down approach: '*corruption begins from the top*')<sup>78</sup>. Our interviewees emphasize and put the blame on politicians, omitting the responsibility of economy's representatives involved in such cases. Consequently, ordinary people view corruption as a normal behaviour to achieve their goals<sup>79</sup>. In our question how comes that although Greeks view corruption as normal, criticise and condemn it in international public opinion and European research (Halman 2001, WVS 2000)<sup>80</sup>, no justification could be given. The Greek State reacts by issuing more laws, severe punishment and increase of bureaucratisation, which citizens try to avoid.

Apart from individualism<sup>81</sup> and State's distrust, our interviewees criticise tolerance and clemency as a national attitude having historical, socio-cultural origins<sup>82</sup> which pertains not

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<sup>68</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 121.

<sup>69</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 122.

<sup>70</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 139; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 33, 52.

<sup>71</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 32, 12, 14.

<sup>72</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI : CODES 48, 13, 55.

<sup>73</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 128.

<sup>74</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 98; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 158.

<sup>75</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 97, 137.

<sup>76</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 78; P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 84, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97.

<sup>77</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 179, 248.

<sup>78</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 1, 182; P10 TG NGOs KINHSI POLITON: CODE 85.

<sup>79</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 15, 16, 18, 125, 77, 127.

<sup>80</sup> Halman, L. (2001). *The European Values Study: A Third Wave. Source book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study surveys*. Tilburg: EVS WORC Tilburg University

([http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/fsw/evs/documents/Publications/Sourcebook/EVS\\_SourceBook.pdf](http://spitswww.uvt.nl/web/fsw/evs/documents/Publications/Sourcebook/EVS_SourceBook.pdf)); World Values Survey/WVS (1999-2004), *Online Data Analysis, Greece 1999*, [GR\_WVS 2000] 01-03-1999-30-06-1999 (<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>).

<sup>81</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 85.

<sup>82</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 67; P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 31, 32.

only to corruption but also to whatever law violation<sup>83</sup>. In addition distrust and disrespect in state's control mechanisms, such as police, are the result of strong disapproval from the left political parties in Greece, especially the young generation, after the last dictatorship<sup>84</sup>. Thus in turn was followed by police indifference in keeping public order and protecting citizens<sup>85</sup>. The appraisal did not affect only the police, but had side effects on core national institutions such as education system, church and religion, distortion of symbols and history etc<sup>86</sup>. Under the trend of the last decade, the respect of national institutions and symbols was regarded as non political correct and characterised as racism, fascism and churchy behaviour<sup>87</sup>. After all, according to this view corruption is higher-more extended-than in the past, yet mainly superficial. According to the second view, corruption always existed and the rates remain more or less the same<sup>88</sup>. It's not new, legislation reforms and new institutions (e.g. GIPA, Ombudsman)<sup>89</sup> are signs of serious efforts and progress which still do not reflect upon country's scores.

Concerning mass media, the interviewees criticise strongly the legal status of private mass media, mainly because it does not provide enough check and balances as in other developed countries (for example USA), in order media's power be moderated<sup>90</sup>. The presentation of political and social issues becomes a commodity and is commercialized; the same applies for corruption<sup>91</sup>. Their presentation is either superficial and descriptive<sup>92</sup> or scandal-mongering, and since real journalism is very expensive, 'TV news changed to shows'<sup>93</sup>.

There are two views about the power of media in Greece. According to the first, they are not considered so powerful, but equally responsible for corruption generation to society<sup>94</sup>. According to the second one the media use their power to manipulate public opinion, politicians and politics in general, for their own good<sup>95</sup>.

After all, NGOs do not seem to have a clear view whether mass media's interests collude with political ones<sup>96</sup>. Still, all interviewees accepted that they fail to inform citizens objectively; they rather distort information or semi-inform, confusing the public<sup>97</sup>. Therefore, their role for informing and sensitizing about corruption<sup>98</sup>, as well as other issues, such as policing, public

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<sup>83</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 47, 103, 118, 74, 135, 136.

<sup>84</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 27, 28.

<sup>85</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 27, 28.

<sup>86</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 258-263, 83.

<sup>87</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 75-77.

<sup>88</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 21.

<sup>89</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 78, 73.

<sup>90</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 67.

<sup>91</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 33, 43, 45, 54.

<sup>92</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 64.

<sup>93</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 20.

<sup>94</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 27, 29, 31.

<sup>95</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 50.

<sup>96</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 52.

<sup>97</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 48, 85, 87, 89, 90.

<sup>98</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODES 90-93, 141.



order etc.<sup>99</sup> is questioned. This contradicts with the demand, of the interviewees to be supported in their work and in anti-corruption campaigns by the mass media<sup>100</sup>.

The status of NGOs is also questioned in respect to their financing and integrity. Some representatives admit that several NGOs are manipulated either by the governments since they are strongly depending on state funds and parties<sup>101</sup> or private enterprises and various economical and political interests outside the country<sup>102</sup>. On the contrary, some other interviewees a) reject the political submission since the members of NGOs are not coming just from political parties, but also from various social and professional groups<sup>103</sup>, and b) accept that NGOs may be financially supported by large corporations or the governments<sup>104</sup>, yet they are not controlled by them<sup>105</sup>.

On account of the measures that Greece should take in order to diminish corruption, representatives of NGOs stress the role of the State, European Union (EU) and NGOs. According to them administrative reform and cultural–ideological ‘reform’ in society is absolutely necessary<sup>106</sup>.

In detail, concerning the State and Public Administration, this reform constitutes:

- Better regulation, administrative and regulatory reform and public consultation in law making procedures<sup>107</sup>.
- Better management of the public sector, improvement of education<sup>108</sup>, performance measurement to raise efficiency<sup>109</sup> and introduction of Conduct Codes for all public officers (civil servants, governments, deputies)<sup>110</sup>.
- Modernization of justice<sup>111</sup>.
- Computerization of public administration and use of new technologies<sup>112</sup>.
- Witnesses’ protection for those denouncing corruption incidents<sup>113</sup>.
- Strict law enforcement<sup>114</sup>.
- Better policing<sup>115</sup>.

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<sup>99</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 31, 32.

<sup>100</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 223, 37, 55.

<sup>101</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 140-143, 146, 148.

<sup>102</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 155-159, 166, 167.

<sup>103</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSE POLITON: CODE 136.

<sup>104</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSE POLITON: CODE 121.

<sup>105</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSE POLITON: CODE 133.

<sup>106</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 48.

<sup>107</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 205, 208.

<sup>108</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 129.

<sup>109</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 40.

<sup>110</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 206.

<sup>111</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSE POLITON: CODES 174, 177.

<sup>112</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 210.

<sup>113</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 209.

<sup>114</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 61.

<sup>115</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 80, 81.



- Design of an (realistic) immigration policy, control of immigration, quotas of immigrants that the country can accept, like the rest developed countries, USA etc. and integration of immigrants in national society and economy<sup>116</sup> with serious efforts for their assimilation.
- Support of healthy competition<sup>117</sup> and integration of paraeconomy in official economic transactions (institution of Observatories to control illegal financial activity<sup>118</sup>, system for lawful tax exemptions<sup>119</sup>).
- Change of voting system in order to decrease candidates' dependency from powerful economic interests<sup>120</sup>. A less proportional voting system with many small districts can result in a powerful government, for introducing reforms<sup>121</sup>.

The interviewees question whether there is a political will from the government to confront corruption and be engaged in reforms<sup>122</sup>. They accentuate civil society's duties to improve its own life, not waiting for politicians<sup>123</sup>. In globalization where things move quickly and problems expand, the state and democratic system fail to react on time<sup>124</sup>. Thus, NGOs and economy representatives should be incorporated in the governance system<sup>125</sup> and social pacts should be formed<sup>126</sup>. Our interviewees note that economy is getting interested in social issues as firms nowadays work in a corporate model<sup>127</sup>.

The interviewees highly appreciate international efforts against corruption because each state is ineffective to fight the problem by itself<sup>128</sup> *'the state is too small for big problems and too big for small problems'* (!)<sup>129</sup>. Most of the interviewees recognise that EU played a significant role for Greece's development<sup>130</sup> generally and in respect to confront corruption. After all, Greece<sup>131</sup> can use good practices of other developed countries, even if this will take time<sup>132</sup>. Moreover, although EU criticizes Greece for corruption, EU itself suffers from the problem, as well as from de-legitimization and extensive bureaucracy<sup>133</sup>; an interviewee noted as well that the co-existence of two law orders –national and European constitution– may result in law insecurity, which eventually will produce such problems as corruption<sup>134</sup>.

<sup>116</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 236-238, 251, 252.

<sup>117</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 177, 185, 186.

<sup>118</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 190.

<sup>119</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 11, 12.

<sup>120</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 66.

<sup>121</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 210, 211, 221, 223.

<sup>122</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 21 ; P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 61, 62; P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 149-151, 154.

<sup>123</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 57, 59, 105, 171, 173.

<sup>124</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 108, 109.

<sup>125</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 110, 112.

<sup>126</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 200.

<sup>127</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 112, 119.

<sup>128</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 116.

<sup>129</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODE 120.

<sup>130</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 117.

<sup>131</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODE 58; P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 9.

<sup>132</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHSEI POLITON: CODES 161, 163.

<sup>133</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 71, 98.

<sup>134</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 99-107.



Our interviewees of the present target group, as the rest of the groups, recognise the role of education<sup>135</sup> and socialization process<sup>136</sup>, in which parents, teachers, university teachers and intellectuals should be engaged<sup>137</sup>. Especially in Greece the alleged modernization of the educational and pedagogic system destroyed national culture and symbols and resulted in declining moral<sup>138</sup>.

NGOs reserve for themselves two roles concerning corruption: a) informing and sensitizing citizens<sup>139</sup>, b) motivating and/or pressing governments to take measures against corruption, enforce law and comply with EU and international conventions<sup>140</sup>. The main difficulties they note for their work are their limited influence because they have short history in Greece, along with their limited resources (staff and budget)<sup>141</sup>. In addition, neither governments nor mass media pay any special attention to them<sup>142</sup>, eventually because of their consensual profile<sup>143</sup>. However, here we must mention that the work of two out of three NGOs we interviewed, have not any special production in order to require attention. Moreover, one of these two in spite of its low production has gained eventually much more publicity it is worth, because of international and governmental support.

Summing up most of the interviewees are optimists<sup>144</sup> about corruption control and its decrease in the long run. It is worth mentioning that one of them sees a positive function in everyday corrupt practices, otherwise –according to him– its total suppression<sup>145</sup> could outcome in blocking economy (‘lubricant’)<sup>146</sup>. In any case our interviewees agree that fighting corruption is a long process related to the modernization of society<sup>147</sup>, for which are needed education, consensus and cooperation of the whole socio-political and economical system<sup>148</sup>. Four out of six of our interviewees in the present target group, are either businessmen or executives. This can eventually explain why their discourse and arguments can be irritating to which group they belong: an interviewee yet stated that ‘the best state is no state’<sup>149</sup>. Their approach is based on personal experience, rich information and many stories, which due to their social status can be promoted as reliable, valid, and admitting no doubt. An elaborated view of the civil society, its role and limits, apart from general declarations is missing, eventually because as mentioned in the beginning, NGOs are new constructions in Greece.

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<sup>135</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHISI POLITON: CODE 4.

<sup>136</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 52; P10 TG NGOs KINHISI POLITON: CODE 68.

<sup>137</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 187-189.

<sup>138</sup> P9 TG NGOs\_D21\_CHL: CODES 258, 259.

<sup>139</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 197-199.

<sup>140</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 194-196.

<sup>141</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 218, 219, 221, 222; P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 62.

<sup>142</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODES 17, 216.

<sup>143</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 101.

<sup>144</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 119.

<sup>145</sup> P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 72.

<sup>146</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 72.

<sup>147</sup> P10 TG NGOs KINHISI POLITON: CODE 75; P13 TG NGOs free\_ex\_TI: CODE 76; P10 TG NGOs KINHISI POLITON: CODE 170.

<sup>148</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 186; P10 TG NGOs KINHISI POLITON: CODE 106.

<sup>149</sup> P12 TG NGOs TI Hellas: CODE 255.



## UNITED KINGDOM

### Target Group Civil Society

*Interviewee 1: A member of anti-corruption NGO 'C'*

The interviewee demonstrated a difficulty in distinguishing normative values from an objective interpretation of the success of anti-corruption efforts in the UK (especially with regard to value and impact on law development and on impact of training and education for companies).

A considerable degree of pragmatism was displayed by the interviewee in accepting logic sympathetic to cases of non-compliance by state and businesses (code family 3). With regard to the BAE scandal, the interviewee viewed sympathetically government's decisions in light of what were accepted to be the competing pressures of British jobs and security, even though he labelled the move "a mistake":

"If I were the head of the SFO and the SFO were given all the information, I would think twice about continuing against the recommendation. I think you have to be a realist."

Concerning industry, the interviewee argued that

"there's been a feeling that somehow you only win contracts in some countries for selling arms or you know, aircraft or really major things, if you bribe, and then there's probably a lot of truth in that. And the question is then do you condone that or do you cease business? So you've got a pretty stark choice."

There was evident optimism from the interviewee about the potential and current effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts in the UK, which was justified with reference to positive legal developments, the raising of the profile of corruption and the development of discourse on the subject within the UK (code family 1).

The language used still suggested that corruption in the UK should not be overplayed or exaggerated (the interviewee referred with soft criticism to the view that the UK did not have corruption problems, but was uncomfortable with the challenge that the NGO itself had under-focused on corruption in the UK; blamed it on lack of resources in the organisation's early days and a desire to help the poor in developing countries.)

The general public were not considered to play an important role in constructing the discourse in the UK or as a source of anti-corruption pressure on government or businesses. Indeed, they are believed to not care much about anti-corruption policies and consider them of secondary importance to promoting British interests.

The code regarding faith in the basic decency of elite morality and corruption by mistake or mistaken logic was prevalent (code family 4). With regard to politicians, the interviewee explicitly rejected the notion of questioning their integrity, expressing also the opinion that:



‘I do believe that the vast majority are highly ethical. I’m not one of these people who write politicians off, because I have to work with them, and I would say that on the whole those people with whom I work are in politics for a good reason, they want to make a difference, and I have every confidence [that this is so].

A perhaps surprising level of support was vocalised for business and portrayal as flexible partners in fighting corruption, more flexible and forward thinking than politicians (code family 3):

“To some extent, politicians have been behind business in recognising the costs. The business world was ahead of politics long before the politicians caught on. But not all businesses, of course.”

The media was interpreted as playing a negative role as much as a positive in anti-corruption efforts, but more rigorous interpretation or critique of their role and influence was lacking.

*Interviewee 2: A member of anti-corruption NGO ‘D’*

The interviewee argued that corruption in the UK today is mostly a matter of the ‘revolving door’ of public officials into positions with business and vice versa, especially with the Ministry of Defence and defence companies. The cash-for-honours scandal, on the other hand, was indicative of the wider issue of ‘patronage politics’, which carries the seeds of corruption and is deeply ingrained in the UK. Here, it is often about an individual winning influence rather than about personal financial gain.

British political and business elites were also presented as having an attitude that corruption is part of other peoples’ culture and therefore there is no alternative to bribing abroad to secure construction and defence contracts for British business (code family 4). There has been too much emphasis on the bribe-takers, rather than the role of the bibe-givers; Western companies reinforce existing corruption and developing countries may often not have the resources to counteract them.

However, it was posited that businesses are increasingly stating that corruption is bad for business (it increases risks, making a company less secure and more vulnerable to blackmail).

The interviewee argued that whilst preaching to other countries about fighting corruption and good governance, the British government has done nothing constructive in the UK:

“There is an absolute lack of political will to prosecute corruption. The withdrawal of the BAE probe is a classic example...”

The UK’s legislation against corruption is “a mess”, and Britain is not properly implementing the OECD Convention. The UK is lagging behind the US and in comparison with other European states (unlike major corruption prosecutions in Germany, France, and Italy, there has only been a terminated enquiry in the UK).



To tackle corruption, a well-resourced investigative body is required, but this has not been a priority in the UK, unlike the goal of being awarded contracts (code family 5). The role of the media has been mixed; it has helped to raise consciousness about corruption, but can often portray it as part of the culture in developing countries. Some NGOs were seen as playing a stronger part in anti-corruption efforts than others (code family 2).

The BAE scandal has encouraged perceptions in the South that the UK has a hypocritical stance on corruption, and this view is a considerable obstacle to the UK's ability to promote good governance internationally. A lesson that could be learned from the UK is that hypocrisy leads to a loss of influence. More lessons should be taken from grassroots anti-corruption efforts in the South, which demonstrate that policies, rather than culture, create corruption.

*Interviewee 3. A member of anti-corruption NGO 'E'*

The interviewee explained that corruption can be regarded as a symptom of a problem, and it is therefore more helpful to try to understand what people are complaining about when they are complaining about corruption. Frequently, corruption is tied to perceptions of inequalities and wastages, but these need to be addressed on a country-by-country basis. Focusing on integrity – accountability, professionalism, and corruption control – is an effective way of tackling corruption.

The interviewee argued that NGOs were not affected in their outlook by the country in which they are based. The interviewee stated that the levels and focus of media and NGO activity here means that there is no reluctance to talk about corruption in Britain. Furthermore, the interviewee suggested “the work ethos of England makes it sort of slightly less prone to corruption” (code family 4).

The interviewee implied that Britain, as a considerable aid donor country, has an interest in pursuing the financial accountability of recipient states, which is why NGOs focus on corruption abroad rather than in the UK. Although the UK might be used as a model for anti-corruption standards in Commonwealth countries, according to the interviewee the NGO rather used

“the traditional templates [...] like [...], Liberal Democracies 101 but like as much as possible the nondescript country [...]”

In general, NGO use of the UK as a model for export was presumed to be implicit rather than explicit, unlike the case of the US.

The interviewee argued that people in developing countries are more likely to criticise British anti-corruption assistance on the basis of British political policies abroad than on the basis of British corruption scandals, but that in general the British have a good reputation abroad in the field of development and anti-corruption efforts (particularly because of the strengths of the Department for International Development).

The interviewee outlined the way in which countering corruption can be more effectively achieved by structuring societal accountability, rather than consciousness-raising.